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FROM DEWSNUP TO NOBELMAN TO THE
BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1994: DID
CONGRESS INTEND TO CHANGE "PREAMENDMENT" LAW WHEN IT ENACTED
§ 1322(C)(2)?
I. INTRODUCrION
As part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 (BRA of
1994)' Congress added 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(2),2 which expands the
debtor's power to modify homestead mortgagees' claims once
specifically protected by the Code. But the extent to which the
debtor can modify homestead mortgagees' claims under this new
section is unclear.
A bankruptcy court and several commentators believe
§ 1322(c)(2) enables debtors to treat certain undersecured mortgagees-those who are entitled to full payment before or during
chapter 13 reorganization-as they would any other undersecured
creditors. They read § 1322(c)(2) as permitting debtors to bifurcate, cramdown, and potentially strip the liens of undersecured
homestead mortgagees. This assessment of § 1322(c)(2) is incorrect, however, in light of principles derived from two United States
Supreme Court cases,' which restrict the effect of § 1322(c)(2) and
preclude an interpretation that allows debtors to bifurcate and
cramdown an undersecured homestead mortgagee's claim.

1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 301, 108 Stat. 4106,
4131 (1994) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(1)-(2) (1994)).
2. All references to Code sections are references to title 11 of the United States
Code.
3. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1994).
4. See In re Young, 199 B.R. 643 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996); see, e.g., 5 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY I 1322.14B (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1996) [hereinafter

COLLIER]; Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical
Evaluation of the Federal Government's Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 69

TUL. L. REv. 373 (1994).
5. See Nobelman v. American Say. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993); Dewsnup v.

Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992).
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In 1992 the Supreme Court stated that it will not interpret
Code provisions to alter preexisting bankruptcy practice unless
Congress indicated it intends such an effect in the provision's legislative history.6 In 1993 the Court held that debtors could not bifurcate and cramdown undersecured homestead mortgagees'
claims in a chapter 13 proceeding. 7 Then in 1994 Congress enacted
§ 1322(c)(2), which appears to allow chapter 13 debtors to bifurcate and cramdown undersecured homestead mortgagees' claims.
However, because this practice was prohibited prior to the BRA of
1994, § 1322(c)(2) should not be interpreted to allow debtors to bifurcate and cramdown undersecured homestead mortgagees'
claims unless Congress indicated in the legislative history that it intended such an effect. And Congress did not!
This Comment interprets § 1322(c)(2) in light of case precedent and congressional intent. Part II provides background information regarding chapter 13's policy objectives and discusses claim
bifurcation and cramdown in the context of a chapter 13 proceeding. Part II also discusses § 1322(c)(2)'s apparent effect under
general rules of statutory construction. Part III discusses Nobelman v. American Savings Bank and Dewsnup v. Timm9 in order to
present the framework for the analysis of § 1322(c)(2). Part IV
analyzes § 1322(c)(2) in light of Nobelman and Dewsnup and concludes that § 1322(c)(2) does not allow debtors to bifurcate and
cramdown undersecured homestead mortgagees' claims.
II. CHAPTER 13 AND THE APPARENT BREADTH OF § 1322(c)(2)

A. Chapter13's Policy Objectives and Congress'sAttempt to
Promote the ResidentialReal Estate Market
Congress created chapter 13 to allow individuals to adjust
their assets and repay their debts over an extended period under
court supervision. A successful chapter 13 plan necessarily requires that debtors adjust their creditors' claims." Allowing debt6. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 419-20.
7. See Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 332.
8. 508 U.S. 324 (1993).
9. 502 U.S. 410 (1992).
10. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 118 (1977).
11. Under chapter 13 the debtor submits a proposed payment plan that must
meet the criteria of § 1325(a) in order for a court to confirm it. See 11 U.S.C. §
1325(a) (1994). Section 1325(a) provides:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall confirm a plan if-
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ors to reduce creditors' claims facilitates an effective readjustment
and is consistent with the Code's strong policy in favor of providing debtors a "fresh start. 1 2 Accordingly, § 1325(a)(5)(B) enables13
debtors to modify their creditors' claims without their consent.
This section is commonly referred to as chapter 13's "cramdown"
provision, as it allows debtors to restructure their debts over the
objection of affected creditors. 4
1. The cramdown process: bifurcation of undersecured creditors'
claims
The presence of the cramdown provision demonstrates Congress's desire to enable chapter 13 debtors to reorganize effectively
without losing their property. Debtors exercise the cramdown
provision by bifurcating, or splitting, undersecured creditors'
claims into secured and unsecured components.'5 Cramdown is offensive to undersecured creditors because they do not6 receive the
full benefit of the original agreement with the debtor.'
Section 506(a), applicable to chapter 13 cases pursuant to
§ 103(a),' 7 authorizes claim bifurcation. It provides:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest.., is a secured
claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest
in the estate's interest in such property... and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's
interest . . .is less than the amount of such allowed

claim.'
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the
plan(B)(i) the plan provides that the holder of such claim retain the
lien securing such claim; and
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be
distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than
the allowed amount of such claim ....

Id.
12. See Richard I. Aaron, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978:

The Full-

Employment-for-Lawyers Bill, 1979 UTAH L. REv. 1, 24.
13. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B).
14. See Michael S. Polk, The Chapter 13 Cramdown: New Nightmare for the
Lender, 19 REAL EST. LJ. 279 (1991).
15. See id. at 281.
16. See id.

17. 11 U.S.C. § 103(a).
18. Id. § 506(a).
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Under § 506(a) a court will determine the amount of the se-

cured claim by assessing the value of the collateral.

9

The amount

of the unsecured claim is the balance remaining after deducting

the amount of the secured claim from the original claim." Thus,
an undersecured creditor is left with two claims against the

debtor's estate after a valuation under § 506(a) and the debtor's
exercise of his or her cramdown power under § 1325(a)(5)(B).2"

A simple hypothetical best demonstrates this process:
C holds a security interest in D's car. D owes $15,000 to C at
the time D files a chapter 13 petition. The car's fair market value

is $10,000. Thus, there is a negative equity of $5,000. After a
valuation under § 506(a), a court will find that C holds a secured
claim in the amount of $10,000 and an unsecured claim in the
amount of $5,000. Under § 1325(a)(5)(B), D's plan can provide
for full payment of the secured portion of C's claim of $10,000, but

less than the full amount of the unsecured portion of C's claim,
which is $5,000.

Most chapter 13 plans propose to pay holders of unsecured

claims much less than the amount that they are owed. z2 Neverthe-

less, a court will confirm such a plan.3 Furthermore, upon successful completion of the plan, the debtor can discharge the remaining
unsecured portion of debt. 24
It is quite clear that claim bifurcation, cramdown, and discharge greatly assist the debtor's ability to obtain a fresh start after
financial reorganization under chapter 13. It is also evident that
cramdown has an adverse impact on undersecured creditors. The
effect is particularly harsh in the residential real estate setting
where a lender's insurance recovery is often denied.2' It is the ef19. See 3 COLLIER, supra note 4,1 506.04.
20. See id.
21. See id.

22. See Polk, supra note 14, at 282 (stating that "completed chapter 13 plans generally provide for between 10-50 percent payment on unsecured claims" and that in
the author's experience a "20 percent unsecuredpayoff figure was most prevalent");
David A. Wisniewski, Note, Residential Mortgages Under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Increasing Case Against Cramdown After Dewsnup v. Timm, 46
VAND. L. REv. 1031, 1033 (1993) (stating that an unsecured creditor's recovery "may
be nothing at all, and is often as little as five or ten cents on the dollar").
23. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B).
24. See 5 COLLIER, supra note 4, 911328.01.
25. See Polk, supra note 14, at 296; Jane Kaufman Winn, Lien Stripping After
Nobelman, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rav. 541, 589 (1994) ("From the point of view of a
lender ...the difference between foreclosure under state law and lien stripping under bankruptcy law is very significant because [insurers] have refused to compensate
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fect of the chapter 13 cramdown that caused residential real estate

lenders to seek special protection under the Code.&
2. Special protection for the homestead mortgagee
The Code contains an express limitation on the debtor's exer-

cise of the cramdown provision by precluding its use against credi-

tors with claims secured only by the debtor's principal residence. 27
Section 1322(b)(2) allows a debtor to modify secured claims "other

than a claim ,secured only by a security interest in real property
that is the debtor's principal residence."8 By prohibiting chapter
13 debtors from using their cramdown power against homestead

mortgagees, 29 the "antimodification" clause reduces the homestead
lender's risk of loss, and was intended to stabilize the residential

real estate market. 3 Congress believed that homestead mortga-

gees would extend loans on more favorable terms if they were
given special protection under the Code.3' If financing was more
accessible, Congress believed a consumer would be more inclined
to buy a home.3 2 Thus, Congress included the antimodification
clause in § 1322(b)(2) to promote the residential real estate market
and assist consumers in their efforts to achieve the American
dream.33
Whether the antimodification clause has helped stabilize the
residential real estate market is unclear. It is clear, however, that
insured lenders following Chapter 13 cramdowns.") (footnote omitted).
26. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
27. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2).
28. Id
29. See Nobelman v. American Say. Bank, 508 U.S. 324,332 (1993).
30. See In re Seidel, 752 F.2d 1382, 1385 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that § 1322(b)(2)
is intended to protect home mortgage lenders rather than homeowners); United Cos.
Fin. Corp. v. Brantley, 6 B.R. 178, 189 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1980) (stating that the purpose of § 1322(b)(2) is "to provide stability in the residential long-term home financing industry and market"); see also Forrester, supra note 4, at 404-05 (commenting
that Congress believed that "permitting modification of home mortgage loans in
Chapter 13 would have a negative impact on the availability of home mortgage
credit").
31. See Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Say. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236, 246 (5th Cir.
1984); Forrester, supra note 4, at 406.
32. See Forrester, supra note 4, at 405.
33. See Capitol Credit Plan of Tenn., Inc. v. Shaffer, 116 B.R. 60, 61 (Bankr.
W.D. Va. 1988) ("This industry deserves such protection because of the valuable social service it provides: fulfilling the American dream of owning your own home.").
But the extent of this special protection afforded homestead mortgagees was not solidified until the Supreme Court decided Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, 508
U.S. 324 (1993).
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the clause makes it more difficult for debtors to retain their resi-

dence during a chapter 13 reorganization because it precludes
debtors from using their cramdown power. 4 As a result, the anti-

modification clause has been criticized for granting too much proAccordingly, Congress
tection to homestead mortgagees. 35
adopted § 1322(c)(2) to limit the effect of the antimodification
clause.36

B. The Scope of§ 1322(c)(2) Under General Rules of Statutory
Construction

The addition of § 1322(c)(2) expands the debtor's power to
modify creditors' claims in chapter 13 cases by limiting
§ 1322(b)(2)'s antimodification clause.37 Section 1322(c)(2) provides:

Notwithstanding subsection (b)(2) and applicable nonbankruptcy law[I]n a case in which the last payment on the original payment schedule for a claim secured only by a security in-

terest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is due before the date on which the final payment
under the plan is due, the plan may provide for the payment of the claim as modified pursuant to section
1325(a)(5) of this title.3 8

Under general rules of statutory construction the plain language of the provision is controlling. 39 The plain language of
§ 1322(c)(2), specifically "[n]otwithstanding subsection (b)(2)," "
indicates that it was enacted as an exception to subsection (b)(2).4 '

Furthermore, subsection (b)(2), as amended, is "[s]ubject to sub-

34. See Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 332.
35. See Winn, supra note 25, at 583, 616-17.
36. See Lori B. Riga, Note, The Best Laid Plans of Corporationsand Consumers:
The Third Circuit,§§ 1123 and 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, and New Jersey's
MergerDoctrine,19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 231, 269 n.220 (1994).
37. See 5 COLLIER, supra note 4, 1322.14B.
38. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(2) (1994).
39. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (stating
that when statutory language is plain the "'sole function of the courts is to enforce it
according to its terms') (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485
(1917)).
40. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(2).
41. See In re Young, 199 B.R. 643,647 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996).
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section] ... (c)" of § 1322.42 Thus, the debtor may modify the
rights of a homestead mortgagee previously protected by
§ 1322(b)(2)'s antimodification clause.
Section 1322(c)(2) will affect homestead mortgagees in shortterm mortgages, mortgages with balloon payments, and long-term
mortgages that are nearing expiration.43 This section converts once
impermissible proposed modifications into potential home savers
because it allows debtors to unilaterally restructure a mortgage
agreement, lessening the chance of default under the agreement
and thus, reducing the possibility that they will lose their homes
due to foreclosure.
For example, debtors whose mortgage agreements fall within
§ 1322(c)(2) may restructure principal payments, reducing the
amount due each month.45 In addition, debtors in a short-term
mortgage contract-an agreement that usually imposes high interest rates--could propose to pay a lesser interest rate over the duration of the plan.t
There is little doubt that these modifications are permissible.47
For a court to hold otherwise would be to render § 1322(c)(2) superfluous. But what is unclear, and what is the focus of this Comment, is just how far § 1322(c)(2) allows the debtor to go. Specifically, does § 1322(c)(2), by incorporating § 1325(a)(5), allow
chapter 13 debtors to bifurcate homestead mortgagees' claims and
exercise chapter 13's cramdown? 4' In essence, does § 1322(c)(2)
bestow upon the debtor a power the Supreme Court explicitly pro42. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2).
43. See 5 COLLIER, supra note 4, 1 1322.14B.
44. See Forrester, supra note 4, at 451.
45. See id (stating that "[tihis provision presumably will permit a Chapter 13
plan to provide for the modification of a short term home equity loan to lower its interest rate or to extend its term to the end of the term of the plan").

46. See iL
47. See 5 COLLIER, supra note 4, 1322.14B.
48. See infra Part IV. A related question, but one not addressed in this Comment, is if bifurcation and cramdown are permissible, upon successful completion of
the chapter 13 plan, can debtors retain their residence and strip undersecured homestead mortgagees' claims to the amount of the secured claim? The Court's holding in
Dewsnup has created a furor over whether lien stripping is permissible at all in the

reorganization chapters. See, e.g., In re Bowen, 174 B.R. 840, 853 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.
1994) (discussing the split in case law on the issue of lien stripping in the reorganization chapters 11, 12, and 13 after the Dewsnup decision). But it appears courts will
permit lien stripping in the reorganization chapters. See id. Thus, if § 1322(c)(2) is
interpreted to permit bifurcation and cramdown, debtors will be able to void the un-

secured portion of a homestead mortgagee's lien. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(d).
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scribed in Nobelman?49
Although several commentators and one court-the only
court to pass on the question-believe § 1322(c)(2) allows debtors
to exercise their right of cramdown on an undersecured homestead
mortgagee's claim, 0 their analyses are unpersuasive because they
ignore the rule of statutory construction used by the Supreme
Court in Dewsnup v. Timm. The rule is that a Code provision
should not be read to alter preexisting practice unless Congress
indicates in the provision's legislative history that it intended it to
do so. 5' Because the Court established that bifurcation and cramdown of an undersecured homestead mortgagee's claim was impermissible in the context of chapter 13 before the BRA of 1994,
§ 1322(c)(2) should not be read to alter that preexisting practice
unless the legislative history indicates Congress so intended. And
it does not!
III. NOBELMAN V. AMERICAN SAVINGS BANK AND DEWSNUP V.
TIMM

Under Dewsnup v. Timm an amended or additional Code
provision that purports to alter preexisting practice does so only to
the extent Congress indicated its intention for such a change in the
provision's legislative history. 2 Accordingly, because the Court's
holding in Nobelman v. American Savings Bank established a
practice prior to the enactment of § 1322(c)(2), and Congress did
not indicate in § 1322(c)(2)'s legislative history that it intended to
alter the Nobelman rule, § 1322(c)(2) should not be interpreted to
allow debtors to bifurcate and cramdown undersecured mortgagees' claims.53

49. 508 U.S. 324 (1993) (holding that a chapter 13 debtor could not bifurcate and
cramdown an undersecured claim that was secured only by a security interest in the
debtor's principal residence).
50. See In re Young, 199 B.R. 643 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996); see, e.g., 5 COLLIER,
supra note 4, 1322.14B (stating that "[t]he exception [referring to § 1322(c)(2)]
from the modification prohibition also overrules for such mortgages the Supreme
Court's decision in Nobelman v. American Savings Bank"); Forrester, supra note 4,
at 451 (stating that § 1322(c)(2) will permit lien stripping of a short-term undersecured loan).
51. See infra Part III.C.4.
52. See infra Part III.C.4.
53. See infra Part IV.A-B.
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A. Nobelman v. American Savings Bank
In Nobelman the Court resolved a split among the circuits regarding the proper interpretation of § 1322(b)(2)'s antimodification clause. Prior to the Nobelman decision, some circuits held
that § 1322(b)(2)'s antimodification clause did not prohibit claim
bifurcation and cramdown of undersecured homestead mortgagees' claims."5 These courts read § 1322(b)(2) as only prohibiting
modification of the secured portion, as determined by § 506(a),5 6 of
undersecured homestead mortgagees' claims.7 Critics of this analysis argued that this interpretation was contrary to the spirit of the
antimodification clause, 58 which was included in the Code to provide special protection for residential real estate lenders. 9 They
argued that this reading of § 1322(b)(2) treated undersecured
homestead mortgagees the same, if not worse than, other undersecured creditors!
Other circuit courts viewed bifurcation and cramdown as an
impermissible modification of a homestead mortgagee's rights under § 1322(b)(2)'s antimodification clause.61 The Supreme Court
in Nobelman affirmed this analysis, solidifying the extent to which
§ 1322(b)(2)'s
antimodification clause protects homestead lend62
ers.
54. See Nobelman v. American Say. Bank, 508 U.S. 324,327 n.2 (1993).
55. See, e.g., In re Bellamy, 962 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Hart, 923 F.2d 1410
(10th Cir. 1991), overruled by In re Wicks, 5 F.3d 1372 (10th Cir. 1993); Wilson v.
Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1990); In re Hougland, 886
F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989).
56. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
57. See cases cited supra note 55.
58. See Winn, supra note 25, at 550 (discussing the arguments made by respondent and amici during the Nobelman litigation).
59. See supra Part II.A.2.
60. See Winn, supra note 25, at 589 (discussing the lack of insurance coverage for
homestead lenders subject to cramdown). But it should be noted that the courts that
allowed debtors to exercise their right of cramdown required that the creditor receive the regular payment amount under the original agreement throughout the life
of the plan. See In re Demoff, 109 B.R. 902, 920 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989) ("The size
and timing of the installment payments will not be altered and thus the scheduled
amount of the monthly contract payment will remain the same, as will the interest
rate."). Thus, the cramdown of an undersecured mortgage changed the payment
schedule by reducing the amount of principal owed, not the amount of the periodic
payment due. See id.
61. See, e.g., In re Nobleman [sic], 968 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1992), affd sub nom.
Nobelman v. American Say. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993).
62. See Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 332. It is interesting to note that the Court approved of a valuation under § 506(a) of American Savings Bank's claim. See id. at
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In resolving these contrasting interpretations, Justice Thomas,
writing for a unanimous Court, concluded that for the purposes of
§ 1322(b)(2) "'a claim secured only by a [homestead lien]' [is] referring to the lienholder'sentire claim, including both the secured
and the unsecured components of the claim.1)' The Court arrived
at this conclusion by focusing on the rights of the mortgagee,
American Savings Bank, not its claim.64 The Court did so because
it believed the mortgagee's rights, not the amount of the secured
component of its undersecured claim, were the focus of the antimodification clause.6
It is not clear, however, that the focus of the antimodification
clause is on rights.6 Nevertheless, the Court's holding was true to
Congress's intent to provide special protection to residential real
estate lenders.
Justice Stevens wrote a brief concurrence on this point.67 He
began by acknowledging that § 1322(b)(2) made it more difficult
for debtors to retain their residences than other secured property.6
But he also wrote that "the legislative history indicat[es] that favorable treatment of residential mortgagees was intended to encourage the flow of capital into the home lending market. 6' 9 Justice Stevens concluded that the majority's opinion was consistent
with Congress's intent to provide special protection to homestead
mortgagees. 70
B. Nobelman: The Aftermath
The reaction to Nobelman has been mixed.7 ' Some lower
court decisions continue to demonstrate a desire to limit the effect
328. But even though the bank was undersecured, the Nobelmans could not exercise
their right of cramdown because the bank held a secured claim. See id. at 329. Bankruptcy courts interpret this aspect of the opinion to exclude lienholders who are entirely unsecured from the protection of § 1322(b)(2). See In re Kidd, 161 B.R. 769
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1993).
63. Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 331 (emphasis added).
64. See id at 328.
65. See id.
66. See Winn, supra note 25, at 552 ("It is far from clear as a matter of statutory
interpretation that the focus of § 1322(b)(2) is really on 'rights' rather than 'secured
claims."').
67. See Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 332 (Stevens, J., concurring).
68. See id (Stevens, J., concurring).
69. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Say. Ass'n,
730 F.2d 236,245-46 (5th Cir. 1984)).
70. See id (Stevens, J., concurring).
71. See Winn, supra note 25, at 616-17.
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of § 1322(b)(2)'s antimodification clause.72 But these decisions can
be reconciled with the policy behind the antimodification clause.
Recall that Congress provided special protection to homestead mortgagees to promote the residential real estate market.73
In so doing, however, Congress explicitly required that the homestead mortgagee be "secured only by a security interest in... the
debtor's principal residence." 74 Thus, although lower courts have
limited the antimodification clause in essentially two ways, they
have done so within the language and spirit of the provision.
The first limitation on the antimodification clause is that a
homestead mortgagee secured by additional collateral might not
benefit from § 1322(b)(2)'s antimodification clause.75 Second,
courts will not afford homestead mortgagees the protection of
§ 1322(b)(2)'s antimodification clause if the homestead mortgagee's claim is determined, after a § 506(a) valuation, to be completely unsecured.76
Although these holdings may appear contrary to the Supreme
Court's procreditor stance in Nobelman, they are not. The Nobelman decision was the product of the Court's desire to remain
true to Con ess's intent to afford special protection to homestead
mortgagees, those who take a security interest only in the property they have helped the borrower obtain.78 While the Nobelman
decision ensured that special protection would be afforded homestead lenders, the ruling was susceptible to abuse by predatory
lenders.7 1 The lower court decisions simply limit this potential for
abuse and ensure that § 1322(b)(2)'s antimodification clause protects its intended beneficiaries.
72. See, e.g., In re Kidd, 161 B.R. 769, 771 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1993) (holding that
the antimodification clause does not protect a completely unsecured mortgagee).
73. See supra Part II.A.2.

74. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1994) (emphasis added).
75. See, e.g., In re Hirsch, 166 B.R. 248, 254 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) (stating that
the antimodification clause would not protect a mortgagee secured by the debtor's
residence and a "wealth of personalty"). The Hirsch court believed that in the wake

of Nobelman, the extent of additional security would be critical to the determination
of whether the antimodification clause protected the mortgagee. See id. Accord-

ingly, the court rejected the debtor's argument that the antimodification clause
should not apply because the extent of additional security held by the mortgagee was
not enough to take the mortgagee outside the antimodification clause. See id. at 25354.
76. See, e.g., Kidd, 161 B.R. at 771.

77. See supra Part II.A.3.
78. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2).
79. See Forrester, supra note 4, at 387-92,451.
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While it is clear that § 1322(c)(2) manifests Congress's intent
to further limit the antimodification clause, 0 the extent to which
§ 1322(c)(2) limits this special treatment is reduced because of the
Court's analysis in Dewsnup v. Timm. 8'
C. Dewsnup v. Timm
Under the interpretive method used in Dewsnup, a Code section should not be interpreted to change preexisting bankruptcy

law absent legislative history indicating that Congress intended
such a result. In light of the Court's analysis in Dewsnup, the
Nobelman decision, which proscribed bifurcation and cramdown
of undersecured homestead mortgagees' claims,3 affects the interpretation of § 1322(c)(2).
1. The Court's opinion

In Dewsnup the Court interpreted § 506(d) in the context of a

chapter 7 proceeding. 4 Although § 506(d) appears to allow debtors to strip the unsecured component of an undersecured claim,
the Court held that it did not have this effect in the context of a
chapter 7 proceeding.85 In essence, despite the unambiguous language of § 506(d), the Court declined to give it full effect because
doing so would have been a departure from the pre-Code practice
that allowed liens to survive bankruptcy unaffected 6 The Court
could not believe Congress intended such a result without at least

80. Another Code amendment reflecting Congress's intent to limit the protection
afforded homestead lenders is § 1322(c)(1). 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(1). Section
1322(c)(1) guarantees debtors a period of redemption, thus facilitating their efforts
to retain their principal residences. See id. The legislative history indicates that §
1322(c)(1) was enacted to overrule In re Roach, 824 F.2d 1370 (3d Cir. 1987). Under
Roach debtors could not cure a default after a foreclosure judgment under §§
1322(b)(3) or 1322(b)(5). See id.
81. 502 U.S. 410 (1992).
82. See id. at 414-20; see also Brian K. Van Engen, Comment, Nobelman v.
American Savings Bank.- The Supreme Court'sAnswer Raises More Questions, 20 J.
CoRp. L, 363, 367 (1995) ("Dewsnup represented a change in the Court's method of
statutory interpretation .... [T]he Court interpreted the statutory sections in question by relying on legislative history.").
83. See Nobelman v. American Say. Bank, 508 U.S. 324,332 (1993).
84. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 412-13.
85. See id. at 417. Section 506(d) provides: "To the extent that a lien secures a
claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void ......
11 U.S.C. § 506(d).
86. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417-19.
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some mention of the change in the section's legislative history. 7
The Court's rationale, however, led to a very curious result.
The Court's holding gave the term "secured claim" a different
meaning under § 506(a) than under § 506(d).88 Although it limited
its holding to the facts of the case, 9 the Court's decision, and its
analysis, spawned great debate."
2. The majority's analysis in Dewsnup
At first glance it appears that the Court examined § 506(d)'s
legislative history because it found the provision ambiguous within
the context of the Code. The Court stated that "the contrasting
positions of the respective parties ... demonstrates that § 506 of
the Bankruptcy Code and its relationship to other provisions of
that Code do embrace some ambiguities." Further, upon reaching its conclusion, the Court stated that "given the ambiguity in the
text, we are not convinced that Congress intended to depart from92
the pre-Code rule that liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected."
From this language it is reasonable to infer that the Court found
§ 506(d) ambiguous in the context of the Code.
Some commentators suggest the contextual ambiguity existed
because of a conflict between § 506(d) and § 722 of the Code.93
The theory is as follows: Section 722 establishes the debtor's right
to redeem personal property at its market value in a chapter 7 proceeding. 94 If the term "secured claim" was given the same meaning
in § 506(d) as in § 506(a), the debtor's ability to avoid a lien would
be so expanded as to render redemption under § 722 meaningless.9 5
Confronted by this dilemma, the Court reconciled the two Code
87. See id at 420.
88. See id. at 417.
89. See id. at 417 n.3 ("[W]e express no opinion as to whether the words 'allowed
secured claim' have different meaning in other provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code.").
90. See, e.g., Margaret Howard, Dewsnupping the Bankruptcy Code, 1 J. BANKR.
L. & PRAc. 513 (1992).
91. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 416 (citing 3 COLLIER, supra note 4, 506.07). But
Justice Scalia, in dissent, chided the majority, stating that it had found the provision
ambiguous simply because the parties disagreed over its meaning. See id at 422-23
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 417 (emphasis added).
93. See Mark S. Scarberry & Scott M. Reddie, Home Mortgage Strip Down in
Chapter13 Bankruptcy: A Contextual Approach to Sections 1322(b)(2) and (b)(5),
20 PEPP. L. REV. 425,459 (1993).
94. See 11 U.S.C. § 722.
95. See Scarberry & Reddie, supra note 93, at 459.
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sections by defining the term "secured claim" in § 506(d) as a
claim prior to bifurcation under § 506(a).96 This enabled § 722, a
specific provision in the context of chapter 7 proceedings, to prevail over § 506(d), a general provision applicable to all chapters of

the Code? This analysis finds some support in the Court's statements that "§ 506... and its relationship to other provisions.., do
embrace some ambiguities,"" and that it was only ruling on the
facts presented.?
But this theory falls short in two ways. First, although the argument was raised in respondents' brief,' this theory was never
specifically addressed by the majority.'' Indeed, if this conflict
exists, it is rather curious that the Court would not explicitly mention it while interpreting § 506(d).'2 Second, it is questionable
whether § 506(d) and § 722 actually conflict.' 3

3. Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion
In dissent Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Souter, attacked the
majority's decision because he saw no ambiguity in the plain lan-

96. See id. at 459-60.
97. See id. at 457-60.
98. Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 416.
99. See id. at 416-17. Assuming, for a moment, that this theory is correct, the
principle derived is that legislative history is controlling if there is an internal conflict
within the Code that renders a provision ambiguous. Under this standard §
1322(c)(2) could not be seen as ambiguous in the context of the Code. See In re
Young, 199 B.R. 643,653 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996). Thus, the plain language would
control and its sparse legislative history would not limit its effect. See id. Again,
however, it is not clear that the Supreme Court based its finding on a contextual
ambiguity. See Scarberry & Reddie, supra note 93, at 459 (stating that "the majority
probably had in mind the relation between § 506(d) and § 722") (emphasis added).
100. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 428 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that
"[r]espondents... identify supposed inconsistencies between petitioner's construction of § 506(d) and ....
§ 722").
101. See id. at 414-20.
102. See id. Interestingly, the majority did adopt the "respondents alternative
position" that § 506(d) should be applied on a case by case basis. See id. at 417. This
position found support in the fact that § 506(d)'s legislative history did not indicate
Congress intended to depart from the pre-Code practice that liens pass through
bankruptcy unaffected. See id. at 416.
103. Justice Scalia, in his dissent, addressed the respondents' argument but found
it unpersuasive. See id. at 428 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Section 722 is necessary, and
not superfluous, because § 506(d) is not a redemption provision."). Justice Scalia
reasoned that Congress made special mention of personal property, the object of §
722, because "state redemption laws are typically less generous for personalty than
for real property." Id.(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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guage of § 506(d)." 4 Justice Scalia chided the majority for finding
§ 506(d) ambiguous, writing that "[t]he Court... rests its decision
upon.., the principle that a text which is 'ambiguous' (a status
apparently achieved by being the subject of disagreement between
self-interested litigants) cannot change pre-Code law without the
imprimatur of 'legislative history."'105 Although this is likely no
more than a facetious dig at the majority opinion, it demonstrates
the uncertainty caused by the majority's analysis.
4. An alternative view: ambiguity is not required
In the absence of an explanation for the Court's finding, a
careful reading of Dewsnup raises the question of whether an ambiguous text is required at all before a court should resort to the
legislative history of a provision that may alter an existing practice.'o After all, the Court scrutinized § 506(d)'s legislative history
even though the language at issue appears clear on its face.' It
can be reasonably inferred that the Court was being prudent and
resorted to the provision's legislative history to ensure that Congress did intend to change pre-Code law. 8 In the absence of such
congressional intention, the Court was reluctant to give the plain
language of § 506(d) its full effect.
Support for this position is found within the Dewsnup opinion' °9 and other cases interpreting Code provisions that might alter
an existing practice.1 The Court stated that if it were writing on a
"clean slate," it would have agreed with the debtors' position that
§ 506(d) permitted lien stripping."' The following statement exemplifies the Court's wary attitude towards a Code provision that
purports to change a prior practice:
[T]his Court has been reluctant to accept arguments that
would interpret the Code, however vague the particular
language under consideration might be, to effect a major
change in pre-Code practice that is not the subject of at
104. See id.
at 420 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 422-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent illustrates the uncertainty

surrounding the majority's finding § 506(d) ambiguous.
106. See id. at 414-20.
107. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a), (d).
108. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417,419-20.
109. See id.
110. See, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 252 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
111. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417.

856

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:841

2
least some discussion in the legislative history."
The Court's use of "however vague" demonstrates its reluctance to interpret a Code provision to alter existing practice without at least some indication in the provision's
legislative history
113
that Congress intended such a change.
Interestingly, if the Court examined § 506(d)'s legislative history solely because it altered an existing practice, the Dewsnup
decision creates a standard for interpreting the Code similar to
that described in Justice O'Connor's dissent in United States v. Ron
PairEnterprises.114 In Ron Pair Enterprises O'Connor wrote that
"bankruptcy statutes will not be deemed to have changed preCode law unless there is some indication that Congress thought
that it was effecting such a change." s
Accordingly, under this standard, Code provisions that change
preexisting bankruptcy practice require legislative history to that
effect. In essence, a court faced with interpreting a section of the
Code that could alter an established practice must engage in a two
part inquiry." 6 First, it must determine whether an established
practice exists; second, it must decide whether Congress indicated
its intent to change that gractice in the legislative history of the
Code section in question.
Admittedly, this interpretive method turns traditional notions
of statutory construction on its head. But one cannot ignore the
implications of the Supreme Court's analysis in Dewsnup.

112. Id. at 419 (emphasis added) (citing United Say. Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 380 (1988)).
113. It is this rule of statutory construction that prevents a debtor from using the
cramdown pursuant to § 1322(c)(2). See infra Part IV.
114. See Ron PairEnters., 489 U.S.at 252 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
115. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey
Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986)). Justice O'Connor also cited United
Savings Association of Texas, as did the majority in Dewsnup, for the proposition
that "[iut is most improbable that [a change in the existing bankruptcy rules] would
have been made without even any mention in the legislative history." Id. at 254
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting United Say. Ass'n of
Texas, 484 U.S. at 380 (1988)).
116. See id at 253-54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
117. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
118. See In re Bowen, 174 B.R. 840, 853 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994) ("[T]he cow is, so
to speak, out of the barn. Courts in the wake of Dewsnup are forced to either duplicate a questionable rationale and disregard accepted canons of interpretation, or disregard the rationale in favor of divining the Supreme Court's concerns and giving
full force and effect to the laws of Congress.").
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IV. THE SCOPE OF § 1322(c)(2) UNDER A DEWSNUP ANALYSIS

A. Does § 1322(c)(2) Alter a PreexistingPractice?
Although § 1322(c)(2) may be used to adjust the monthly
principal or interest payment under a mortgage agreement, 119 it
may also allow debtors to cramdown an undersecured homestead
mortgagee's claim.' 2° Such a plan, however, runs afoul of the
Court's holding in Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, which expressly prohibits bifurcation and cramdown of homestead mortgagees' claims.12 ' Because § 1322(c)(2) could be, and has been, interpreted as overruling an established bankruptcy practice, 22 a court
should conclude that it alters a preexisting practice under Dewsnup v. Timm.'23
On the other hand, a court may be reluctant to give the Nobelman decision the same effect as a common law pre-Code practice like the one at issue in Dewsnup.124 But the Court's language
in Dewsnup indicates that the rule of Nobelman should be equated
to a common law pre-Code practice 1 5 In Dewsnup the Court
stated that "[w]hen Congress amends the bankruptcy laws, it does
not write 'on a clean slate.' 1 26 Thus, in amending the Code in
1994,'2 particularly with the addition of § 1322(c)(2), which affects
the treatment of homestead mortgagees' claims, Congress was not
writing on a clean slate.
Further, the controversy surrounding the Nobelman decision
and the effect of § 1322(b)(2)'s antimodification clause 28 accentuate the need for caution when interpreting legislation that may
change the status quo. When examining legislation in this area, a
court, like the Court in Dewsnup, should be wary of interpreting
statutes in a manner that would lead to drastic changes in existing
119. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47.
120. See In re Young, 199 B.R. 643, 654 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996); see also supra
text accompanying notes 48-50.
121. See Nobelman v. American Say. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993); see also supra Part III (discussing the Nobelman litigation and the effect of the Court's holding).
122. See Young, 199 B.R. at 654.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95.
124. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410,417 (1992).
125. See id at 419.
126. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Emil v. Hanley, 318 U.S. 515, 521 (1943)).
127. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4131 (1994)
(codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(1)-(2) (1994)).
128. See supra Parts III.A-B.
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practice.
In addition, implicit in the Court's opinion in Dewsnup is that
Congress must indicate with sufficient definiteness the extent of a
change in order to provide for consistent interpretation and administration of the Code.129 Indeed, this rationale is consistent
with requiring that Congress demonstrate, beyond the plain language of a new provision, that it intends to alter established law.
B. Section 1322(c) (2)'sLegislative History
The second inquiry under Dewsnup is whether § 1322(c)(2)'s
legislative history demonstrates Congress's intent to allow debtors
to bifurcate and cramdown claims protected by the rule announced
3'
in Nobelman."
Section 1322(c)(2)'s legislative history indicates that Congress
intended to overrule a case from the Third Circuit, First National
Fidelity Corp. v. Perry.' Curiously, there is no mention of Nobelman in § 1322(c)(2)'s legislative history.3 2 Indeed, if Congress
intended to overrule Nobelman, it is strange that there would be
no mention of that recent Supreme Court case in § 1322(c)(2)'s
legislative history. But Congress's failure to mention Nobelman
does not end the inquiry. Whether the debtor can bifurcate and
cramdown an undersecured homestead mortgagee's claim depends
upon an analysis of the Perry holding, the case
Congress expressly
33
intended to overrule with this new provision.
1. FirstNationalFidelity Corp. v. Perry
In Perry a fully secured mortgagee, First National Fidelity
Corp., obtained a foreclosure judgment against the mortgagor's
principal residence.'3 Prior to the foreclosure sale, Perry filed a
petition under chapter 13.13' Her plan 1proposed
to pay First Na36
tional a total of $17,292 over five years, an amount that was less
than the amount First National was due under the mortgage

129. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 419-20.
130. See supra Part III.A.

131. 945 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1991); see 140 CONG. REc. H10,769 (daily ed. Oct. 4,
1994); 5

COLLIER,

supra note 4,

1322.14B.

132. See 140 CONG. REc. H10,769 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994).
133. See id.

134. See Perry,945 F.2d at 62.
135. See id.
136. See id.
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agreement. 37 Accordingly, First National moved for relief from
the automatic stay, arguing that Perry's plan proposed an impermissible modification of its rights. 39 The bankruptcy court denied the motion.'4 But on appeal to the district court, First National successfully argued that the proposed plan constituted an
impermissible modification under § 1322(b)(2).
The Third Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that
§ 1322(b)(2) prohibited confirmation of Perry's plan, which allowed for payment of the foreclosure judgment over the plan's duration. 42 The court's analysis was based on the fact that New Jersey law entitled the creditor to immediate payment.' 43 To allow
payment over the duration of the plan would permit a modification of First National's rights.' 44 Because First National was secured only by Perry's principle residence, § 1322(b)(2)'s antimodification clause precluded her from altering First National's right to
immediate payment. 4
2. By hitting Perry,Congress missed Nobelman
The factual scenario in Perry indicates that Congress intended
to allow debtors to extend payment of an obligation immediately
due over the life of their plan. This is consistent with Congress's
desire to help debtors retain their residences during chapter 13 reorganization. 6 It does not, however, lead one to believe that
Congress intended to allow debtors to bifurcate and cramdown
undersecured homestead mortgagees' claims. The case did not
even involve an undersecured creditor!
137. See id. Perry's proposed plan called for 10% interest on $13,562, thus total-

ing $17,292 over the plan's five-year duration, while the original terms of the agreement called for 20.99% interest on $11,844.22. See id.

138. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994). The debtor's filing of a bankruptcy petition triggers the automatic stay, which prohibits creditors from seizing the debtor's assets.

139. See Perry, 945 F.2d at 62.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 67.
143. See id. at 65.
144. See id. at 65-66. It had been argued that Ms. Perry was curing the defaulted
mortgage. See id A cure is most often defined as restoring the obligation to the
status quo and is permissible even if the creditor is protected by § 1322(b)(2)'s antimodification clause. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (1994).
145. See Perry, 945 F.2d at 65 (citing In re Seidel, 752 F.2d 1382, 1384 (9th Cir.
1985)).
146. See In re Jones, 188 B.R. 281, 284 (Bankr. D. Or. 1995) (stating that the policy of supporting debtors' attempts to retain their residences pervades § 1322(c)(2)).
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Furthermore, the court in Perry stated in dicta that it would
have been permissible to bifurcate First National's claim had it
been undersecured. 47 The court relied on Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp.,14 a case that was clearly rejected by the
Supreme Court in Nobelman.149 By overruling Perry, albeit on
other grounds, Congress was indirectly supporting the Court's decision in Nobelman.
To summarize, Congress's express mention of Perry indicates
that § 1322(c)(2) permits debtors to modify principal and interest
payments of mortgage obligations that mature immediately before
the filing of, or during, a chapter 13 plan. But Congress's desire to
overrule Perry does not support an interpretation of § 1322(c)(2)
that permits bifurcation and cramdown of undersecured homestead mortgagees' claims. Rather, under the Supreme Court's
analysis in Dewsnup, a court should not interpret § 1322(c)(2) as
permitting bifurcation and cramdown of undersecured homestead
mortgagees' claims that come due before or during a chapter 13
plan because Congress did not indicate it intended to overrule Nobelman with respect to such mortgages. Indeed, if Congress
wanted to overrule a recent United States Supreme Court case,
why would it not say so?
C. EarlyApplication of § 1322(c) (2)
There have been several recent decisions involving §
150 The first case to interpret the new provision was In
1322(c)(2?.151
re Escue. In Escue the court held that § 1322(c)(2) applies to
mortgages that mature prepetition.'1 2 Although the plain language
of § 1322(c)(2) does not include obligations that mature prepetition,'5s the legislative history expressly mentions Perry, a case that
involved that type of obligation.1 - Like Perry, Escue dealt with a
147. See Perry,945 F.2d at 66 n.6.
148. 895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1990), overruled by Nobelman v. American Say. Bank,
508 U.S. 324 (1993).
149. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
150. See In re Watson, 190 B.R. 32 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995); In re Sarkese, 189 B.R.
531 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995); Jones, 188 B.R. at 281; In re Chang, 185 B.R. 50 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1995); In re Escue, 184 B.R. 287 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1995).
151. 184 B.R. 287 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1995).

152. See icL at 293.
153. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(2).
154. See Escue, 184 B.R. at 293. Because Perry did not deal with the factual sce-

nario expressly addressed by § 1322(c)(2), one court concluded that § 1322(c)(2) has
no legislative history. See Jones, 188 B.R. at 283.
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homestead mortgagee's claim that was due prepetition. 55 Thus,
the result reached in Escue is consistent with the result Congress
sought to achieve by overruling Perry. Further, the Escue court's
analysis is consistent with the Supreme Court's analysis in Dewsnup: both looked to legislative history to determine the scope of a
Code provision that altered established bankruptcy law.
In addition, the court viewed the section's general purposeto help debtors keep their home-as grounds for extending its
scope to encompass mortgages by
thatother
mature
preeiuon.'5 This incourts.
accepted
been
terpretation has
More recently a bankruptcy court held that § 1322(c)(2) does
allow bifurcation and cramdown of an undersecured homestead
mortgagee's claim. 58 In In re Young the court relied upon the Supreme Court's statement in Dewsnup that "'where the language is
unambiguous, silence in the legislative history can not [sic] be controlling."' 59 Finding the language of § 1322(c)(2) unambiguous,
the Young court permitted the debtor to bifurcate and cramdown
the undersecured homestead mortgagee's claim under §
1322(c)(2).16
But the Young court's reliance on this statement is misplaced.
As stated earlier, it is unclear why the Court found the provision at
issue in Dewsnup ambiguous.1 6 The Supreme Court's failure to
explain its conclusion should make lower courts wary, absent at
least some indication by Congress that it intended to effect such a
change, of interpreting a new Code provision to alter preexisting
practice. Indeed, relying on the Court's finding of ambiguity as the
basis for its examination of § 506(d)'s legislative history ignores
the Court's underlying concern that it should be prudent when interpreting a Code provision that might alter a preexisting bankruptcy practice.

155. See Perry,945 F.2d at 62; Escue, 184 B.R. at 287-88.
156. See Escue, 184 B.R. at 293. The court also stated § 1322(c)(2) overruled No-

belman as to claims covered by § 1322(c)(2). See id. But this statement was dicta
and appears to have come straight from an oft cited bankruptcy treatise. See id. at
n.7. (citing 5 COLLIER, supra note 4, 1322.14B).
157. See Watson, 190 B.R. at 32; Sarkese, 189 B.R. at 531; Jones, 188 B.R. at 281;

Chang, 185 B.R. at 50.
158. See In re Young, 199 B.R. 643 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996).
159. Id. at 653 (quoting Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410,419-20 (1992)).
160. See id at 654.
161. See supra Part III.C.4.
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VI. CONCLUSION

The addition of § 1322(c)(2) raises the issue of whether debtors can bifurcate and cramdown certain undersecured homestead
mortgagees' claims. Admittedly, construing § 1322(c)(2) to allow
debtors to cramdown an undersecured homestead mortgagee's
claim is consistent with the BRA of 1994's general purpose to help
debtors retain their homes throughout a chapter 13 reorganization.
However, because of Supreme Court precedent and an inconclusive legislative history, courts should not interpret § 1322(c)(2) to
empower chapter 13 debtors to that extent.
Timothy B. McCaffrey, Jr.*

* I would like to thank Professor Dan Schecter for his interest and insight. I
would also like to thank the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review editors and staff for
their assistance.

